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State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The 
European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, And 
International Legal Minimums of Protection 
Lee Hasselbacher* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 United Nations studies report that the most common form of violence experienced by 
women around the world is physical violence inflicted by an intimate partner.1 As a global 
average, at least one in three women is beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused by an 
intimate partner in the course of her lifetime.2  
¶2 Domestic violence is defined by the U.S. Department of Justice as a pattern of abusive 
behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control 
over another intimate partner.3 It can consist of physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or 
psychological acts that serve to intimidate, manipulate, humiliate, isolate, coerce, threaten, or 
hurt someone.4 It has a dramatically disproportionate impact on women worldwide,5 but only 
recently has it been recognized as a legitimate human rights violation.  
¶3 Over the last two decades, international human rights instruments, decisions, and dedicated 
advocates have advanced the understanding of domestic violence. Once considered a private act 
committed with widespread impunity, domestic violence is now viewed as a human rights 
violation that states have a responsibility to address. Part II of this paper will trace the history of 
this progression and the emergence of a “due diligence” standard to assess a state’s response to 
domestic violence. Part III will examine the recognition of the due diligence standard as a rule of 
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1 UNITED NATIONS DEP’T PUBLIC INFORMATION, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL’S CAMPAIGN, UNITE TO END VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN, FACTSHEET, DPI/2498 (Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/women/endviolence/pdf/VAW.pdf.  
2 Id.   
3 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/ovw-fs.htm (last visited Dec. 
7, 2008).  
4 Id.  
5 U.N. Children’s Fund, Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, 6 INNOCENTI DIGEST 1, 3-5 (2000), available 
at http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf [hereinafter UNICEF]. This report observed that domestic 
violence is in most cases violence perpetrated by men against women and violence by women against men accounts 
for a small percentage of domestic violence. Some relevant statistics include: 29% of women in Canada (a nationally 
representative sample of 12,300 women) reported being physically assaulted by a current or former partner since the 
age of 16; 25% of women in the U.K. (a random sample of women from one district) had been punched or slapped 
by a partner or ex-partner in their lifetime; up to 45% of married men in India acknowledged physically abusing 
their wives, according to a 1996 survey of 6,902 men; 35% of women in Egypt (a nationally representative sample 
of women) reported being beaten by their husband at some point in their marriage; 41% of women in Uganda 
reported being beaten or physically harmed by a partner; 41% of men reported beating their partner (representative 
sample of women and their partners in two districts); 19% of 6,097 women surveyed in Colombia have been 
physically assaulted by their partner in their lifetime; 29% of women in Estonia aged 18-24 fear domestic violence, 
and “the share rises with age, affecting 52% of women 65 or older, according to a 1994 survey of 2,315 women.” 
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customary international law with increasingly defined state obligations. Part IV will analyze the 
evolution of the due diligence standard within the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
the application of the standard in two landmark cases, Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria6 and Opuz v. 
Turkey7. Both cases held national governments responsible for failing to exercise due diligence 
to adequately protect individuals from domestic violence. The decisions in these cases not only 
affirm the use of the due diligence standard as a tool for assessment, but also they begin to 
clarify the practical obligations of protecting victims from domestic violence and preventing, 
investigating, and prosecuting such violence. In particular, the ECHR highlights the need for 
enforceable measures of protection and a legislative framework that enables criminal 
prosecutions of domestic violence in the public interest. Furthermore, the decision in Opuz v. 
Turkey recognizes that a State’s failure to exercise due diligence to protect women against 
domestic violence is gender-based discrimination, violating women’s right to equal protection of 
the law.8  
II.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WITHIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
A. Violations of Public and Private Rights  
¶4 As studies and statistics demonstrate, domestic violence is not confined to any one culture 
or region.9 Instead, domestic violence exists in countries with varying social, political, economic, 
and cultural structures, and its pervasiveness “signifies that the problem does not originate with 
the pathology of an individual person.”10 However, despite the widespread nature of the problem, 
it has long been considered a private matter best dealt with in the home, not an issue of public 
policy.  Categorized as such, domestic violence went largely unaddressed within traditional 
international human rights discourse.  
¶5 The human rights movement, dating back to the signing of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the founding of the United Nations, has placed heavy focus on civil and 
political violations that occur on the streets, in prisons, in the government, and in the press. 
Issues such as state-sponsored torture, extrajudicial execution, prisoners of conscience, and war 
crimes have received a high priority in human rights treaties and in the jurisprudence of 
international tribunals.11  
¶6 Feminist critiques leveled at international human rights discourse have highlighted the 
“fragmented and individualistic language of the mainstream understanding of rights which are 
based upon a male model of what it means to be ‘human.’”12 Subsequently, a focus on 
                                                 
6 Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Bevacqua%20%7C%20v
.%20%7C%20Bulgaria&sessionid=55485783&skin=hudoc-en. 
7 Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=851046&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydo
cnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 
8 Id. at ¶ 191. 
9 UNICEF, supra note 5, at 4-5. 
10 Subrata Paul, Combatting Domestic Violence Through Positive International Action in the International 
Community and in the United Kingdom, India, and Africa, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227, 243 (1999).  
11 Examples include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the 
Geneva Conventions, and tribunals established to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity, often 
recognized in the context of conflict.  
12 The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Integration of the Human 
Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women: The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for 
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“classical” human rights violations occurring in the public sphere “systematically disadvantages 
women, since they are traditionally restricted to the private sphere (family, home).”13 This 
public/private division historically correlated with the separate societal roles of women and 
men.14 Since traditional gender roles grant more freedom to men to move and act within the 
public sphere (e.g., working outside the home, participating in government, and serving in the 
military), those roles also make violations committed against men more visible and easier to 
redress. Issues of concern to women (e.g., violence within the family, denial of education, and 
lack of economic freedom) escape notice. Although governments may deny gender bias in justice 
mechanisms, the public/private framework often influences the very structure of the system.15  
¶7 A gendered perspective is also relevant when distinguishing between “negative” and 
“positive” rights. Traditionally, civil and political rights like freedom of speech place limits on 
the government’s ability to interfere with the individual’s enjoyment of these rights. These are 
“negative” rights because the government must refrain from infringing upon them. However, 
international jurisprudence now recognizes that “positive” obligations can flow from recognition 
of “negative” rights. For example, national and international courts acknowledge a state 
responsibility to protect and ensure the right to life, not merely refrain from violating it. Kenneth 
Roth, Director of Human Rights Watch, argues that “[w]hen a state makes little or no effort to 
stop a certain form of private violence, it tacitly condones that violence. This complicity 
transforms what would otherwise be wholly private conduct into a constructive act of the 
state.”16 Thus, states can be held accountable for tolerating domestic violence perpetrated by 
non-state actors.17 
B. Recognizing an International Problem  
¶8 The evolving concept of state responsibility for individual acts of violence and the 
subsequent recognition of domestic violence as a violation of human rights is a recent advance in 
international law. To understand the potential of the due diligence standard as a legal tool and 
appreciate the significance of recent decisions such as those in the ECHR, it is important to trace 
the history of this development.   
¶9 In 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and heralded as the “international bill of 
rights for women,” containing provisions meant to end discrimination toward women.18 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, ¶ 56, delivered to the Economic and Social Council and the Commission 
on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006). 
13 Beate Rudolf & Andrea Eriksson, Women’s Rights Under International Human Rights Treaties: Issues of Rape, 
Domestic Slavery, Abortion, and Domestic Violence, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 507, 522-523 (2007). 
14 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence, Health, and International Law, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 61, 66 (2008).  
15 Id.  
16 Kenneth Roth, Domestic Violence as an International Human Rights Issue, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 326, 330 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994). 
17 Rudolf & Eriksson, supra note 13, at 523. 
18 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, at pt. 1, art. 
1, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180(Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW] 
(defining “discrimination” as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect 
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field"). See also U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of 
Econ. & Soc. Affairs. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2008) (referring to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women as an international bill of rights for 
women).  
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Although it was a landmark treaty, CEDAW did not explicitly address the issue of violence 
against women.19 It was not until several years later that international bodies began to 
acknowledge the connection between violence against women and discrimination. 
¶10 In the mid-1980s, domestic violence grew more prominent as an issue of international 
concern. Statements and resolutions on violence in the family were issued by the U.N. Economic 
and Social Council, the U.N. General Assembly, and a U.N. Expert Group Meeting on Violence 
in the Family held in 1986.20 These documents drew attention to the international character of the 
problem, asked states to develop action plans to address domestic violence, and led to further 
studies.21  
¶11 In 1989, the U.N. released a report on Violence Against Women in the Family which 
argued that domestic violence is not random, but “associated with inequality between women 
and men.”22 An additional General Assembly resolution called for nations to work together to 
develop strategies to prevent violence and protect victims.23 In 1992, thirteen years after 
CEDAW’s adoption, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW Committee”) incorporated violence against women into its reading of CEDAW by 
adopting General Recommendation 19. This recommendation established a robust definition of 
violence against women and mandated that “full implementation of the Convention required 
states to take positive measures to eliminate all forms of violence against women.”24 
Significantly, the document also identified the “due diligence” standard for determining whether 
states have fulfilled the objectives of the recommendation.25 This standard, new to international 
law, suggested that CEDAW’s member states had particular obligations to ensure the elimination 
of violence against women.  
III. INTRODUCING THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD 
¶12 The concept of “due diligence” regarding state responsibility for non-state acts was first 
developed in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, a case heard by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR) in 1988.26 For the first time, the Court considered state responsibility 
for enforced disappearances. Specifically, the case related to the abduction and disappearance of 
a graduate student, Angel Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez. Relying on evidence that showed a 
                                                 
19 See CEDAW, supra note 18. 
20 See, e.g., U.N. Econ & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 1984/14, 19th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. E/RES/1984/14 (May 
24, 1984); G.A. Res. 40/36, ¶¶ 1-7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/36 (Nov. 29, 1985). 
21 Meyersfeld, supra note 14, at 79. 
22 Id. at 80 (quoting Division for the Advancement of Women, The U.N. Work on Violence Against Women, 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/unwvaw.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009)). 
23 Id. at 81. 
24Commission on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence 
Against Women, 11th Sess., ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1993), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm; see also id. ¶ 7 (“Gender-based 
violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under 
general international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the 
Convention. These rights and freedoms include: (a) The right to life; (b) The right not to be subject to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (c) The right to equal protection according to humanitarian 
norms in time of international or internal armed conflict; (d) The right to liberty and security of person; (e) The right 
to equal protection under the law; (f) The right to equality in the family; (g) The right to the highest standard 
attainable of physical and mental health; (h) The right to just and favourable conditions of work”). 
25 Meyersfeld, supra note 14, at 82. 
26 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988). 
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pattern of similar disappearances tied to government suppression of dissidents, the Court found 
that Velasquez Rodriguez’s disappearance was “carried out by agents who acted under cover of 
public authority.”27 Moreover, the Court went on to observe that even if that fact had not been 
proven, “the failure of the State apparatus to act, which is clearly proven, is a failure on the part 
of Honduras to fulfill the duties it assumed” under the American Convention on Human Rights.28 
These duties created a positive obligation to ensure Velasquez Rodriguez the “free and full 
exercise of his human rights.”29 
¶13 Expanding on this analysis, the Court found that an illegal act “which violates human 
rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State … can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the [American Convention on Human 
Rights].”30 In other words, where rights are guaranteed—in this case by the American 
Convention on Human Rights—the state is obligated to exercise “due diligence” to ensure their 
fulfillment.31 As a consequence of this duty, the “States must prevent, investigate and punish any 
violation” of rights.32 The existence of a legal system is not enough; the government must also 
“conduct itself so as to effectively ensure” the enjoyment of rights.33 This language and legal 
framework provided the foundation for the due diligence standard, which spread beyond the 
Inter-American system and is now applied to non-state acts of domestic violence. 
A. Due Diligence in Responding to Domestic Violence  
¶14 In 1993, there were two major developments that furthered the application of the due 
diligence standard within the domestic violence context: the issuance of the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) by the U.N. General Assembly and the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.34 DEVAW incorporated the 
principles of General Recommendation 19 and formally adopted the “due diligence” standard as 
a tool to assess a State’s obligations with regard to all forms of violence against women. In 
incorporating this standard, DEVAW declared that all U.N. member states have a duty to 
“pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against 
women,” including “due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national 
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetuated by the 
State or by private persons.”35 DEVAW affirmed that violence against women constitutes a 
“violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their 
enjoyment of those rights and freedoms.”36 DEVAW represented significant consensus on the 
                                                 
27 Id. ¶ 182.  
28 Id. ¶ 182.  
29 Id. ¶ 182.  
30 Id. ¶ 172 (emphasis added). 
31 Id. ¶¶ 180, 182; see also Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, pt. I, ch. I, art. 1, ¶ 1(stating that “The States Parties to this Convention 
undertake to . . . ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and 
freedoms” enumerated in the document).  
32 Rodriguez, supra note 26, ¶ 166. 
33 Id. ¶ 167.  
34 Meyersfeld, supra note 14, at 82.  
35 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 
(Feb. 23, 1994) [hereinafter DEVAW]. 
36 Id. ¶ 5. 
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principles for addressing violence against women. The Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém Do 
Pará), passed in 1994 by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, provided 
additional support for this consensus and provided early guidance for member states.37 
Furthermore, the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing included elimination of 
all forms of violence against women as one of its twelve strategic objectives and listed concrete 
actions to be taken by governments, the United Nations, and international and nongovernmental 
organizations. 
¶15 At the same time, the newly appointed Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, was actively investigating violence against women in the family. 
According to her 1996 report, “State-tolerated violence intended to control women in their so-
called private lives has thus far not been accounted for” and that the public versus private 
rhetoric had “fundamentally affected perceptions of women’s rights.”38 She went on to argue that 
“the role of State inaction in the perpetuation of the violence combined with the gender-specific 
nature of domestic violence require that domestic violence be classified and treated as a human 
rights concern rather than merely as a domestic criminal justice concern.”39 Coomaraswamy’s 
report referenced the principles articulated in General Recommendation 19 and DEVAW, as well 
as the foundation for state responsibility established in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras. She 
argued that “a State that does not act against crimes of violence against women is as guilty as the 
perpetrators.”40 Coomaraswamy declared that states must exercise due diligence to ensure 
enforcement of laws if they wish to avoid such complicity. 
¶16  In attempting to provide stronger practical guidance to states, Coomaraswamy’s report 
included suggestions for model domestic violence legislation. Coomaraswamy acknowledged 
that there is no single model that would lead to the eradication of violence against women in all 
societies, but she identified several key elements that should be adapted and included in any 
efforts.41 These elements include effective responses from law enforcement, formal measures of 
protection, such as civil protection orders, and prosecution and punishment of perpetrators.  
¶17 To this extent, the model legislation delineated the duties of police officers in preventing 
and responding to domestic violence. For example, their duties should include responding to 
every request for assistance and protection in cases of domestic violence,42 assigning equal 
                                                 
37 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534; id., art. 7 (stating, inter alia, that “The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against 
women and agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate 
such violence and undertake to: . . . b. apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence 
against women; . . . d. adopt legal measures to require the perpetrator to refrain from harassing, intimidating or 
threatening the woman or using any method that harms or endangers her life or integrity, or damages her property; e. 
take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to amend or repeal existing laws and regulations or to 
modify legal or customary practices which sustain the persistence and tolerance of violence against women; f. 
establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence which include, among 
others, protective measures, a timely hearing and effective access to such procedures.”). 
38 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, Its Causes and Consequences,pt. II, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 (Feb. 5, 1996) (prepared by Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Comm’n on Hum.Rts. Res. 1995/85) [hereinafter 1996 Report of the Special 
Rapporteur]. 
39 Id. pt. III, ¶ 29.  
40 Id. pt. III, ¶ 39 (internal citation omitted).  
41 Id. ¶ 120. 
42 U.N. Economic & Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2 (Feb. 2, 
1996) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
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priority to calls concerning abuse by family and household members as to calls alleging similar 
abuse and violations by strangers,43 providing protection to the reporter of violence, and 
arranging removal of the offender from the home or arresting the offender if the victim is in 
danger.44 Coomaraswamy also discussed the necessity of official mechanisms to obtain 
protection orders. Such orders would generally forbid abusers from having any contact with the 
victim, exclude the abuser from a shared home, and provide police a mechanism for arrest if 
further violence occurs.45 Coomaraswamy called for police and courts to monitor compliance 
with protection orders and treat violations of the orders as a crime punishable by fine or 
imprisonment.46 Furthermore, Coomaraswamy called for a legal system that criminalizes 
domestic violence and effectively ensures that law enforcement and judicial officers actually 
investigate, prosecute, and punish perpetrators.47  
¶18 This early effort by Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy to define the obligations that 
demonstrate compliance with the due diligence standard provided an outline of legal minimums 
that would continue to take shape in international documents and jurisprudence. 
B. The Due Diligence Standard in the Inter-American Commission and the CEDAW Committee  
¶19  In the wake of the articulation of the due diligence standard, quasi-judicial and treaty-
monitoring bodies began to grapple with interpreting the standard and giving it meaning in 
individual cases. Both the Inter-American Commission and the CEDAW Committee heard 
domestic violence complaints; the decisions of those bodies built upon the principles discussed 
above and highlighted the practical need for protective measures and effective prosecutions. 
¶20 In 2001, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”) heard a 
complaint from Maria da Pehna Maia Fernandes alleging that the Brazilian government had 
implicitly condoned the violence perpetrated against her by her husband, Heredia Viveiros, by 
failing to adequately protect her or punish Viveiros for his crimes.48 The local public prosecutor 
had filed attempted murder charges against Viveiros, but the case had languished for eight years 
before the court filed a guilty verdict. In 1998, following appeals and a second trial that resulted 
in a guilty verdict, Mrs. Fernandes filed her complaint with the Commission. By that point, it had 
been more than 15 years since the attack, there had been no judicial resolution, and Viveiros had 
remained free the entire time.49  
¶21 The Commission looked to several controlling documents in finding that Brazil had failed 
to exercise due diligence in responding to the plight of Mrs. Fernandes. Among other legal 
sources, the Commission relied on the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
and the Convention of Belém Do Pará.50  In its report, the Commission found that the violence 
suffered by Mrs. Fernandes was “part of a general pattern of negligence and lack of effective 
                                                                                                                                                             
1995/85), available at 
http://193.194.138.190/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/0a7aa1c3f8de6f9a802566d700530914?Opendocument 
[hereinafter Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence]. 
43 Id. ¶ 14. 
44 Id. ¶ 17. 
45 1996 Report of the Special Rapporteur , supra note 38, ¶ 125. 
46 Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, supra note 42, ¶ 41.  
47 Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, supra note 42, ¶ 37. 
48 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 54/01, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20, rev. 16 (2000). 
49 Id. ¶¶ 1-20.  
50 Id.  
Vol. 8:2] Lee Hasselbacher 
 197
action by the State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors” and that “general and 
discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness” creates a “climate that is conducive to domestic 
violence.”51 Specifically, the Commission found Brazil to be in violation of Articles 8 and 25 of 
the American Convention, which guarantee rights to a fair trial and judicial protection.52 The 
Commission reasoned that by allowing perpetrators of domestic violence to enjoy impunity with 
no threat of prosecution or punishment, Brazil was complicit.53  
¶22 The Commission also found that Brazil’s failure to respond to domestic violence 
evidenced widespread gender discrimination. In reaching this finding, the Commission relied on 
Article 24 of the American Convention, which articulates the equal rights of all individuals 
before the law.54 The Commission pointed to evidence from studies showing that in Brazil, 
women are affected by family violence in significantly disproportionate numbers to men and that 
complaints of domestic violence are often not fully investigated or prosecuted.55 The 
Commission noted that 70% of the criminal complaints pertaining to domestic violence were put 
on hold without any conclusion being reached and that only 2% of criminal complaints of 
domestic violence against women lead to the conviction of the perpetrator.56 According to the 
Commission, such a systematic failure on the part of a state to meet a due diligence standard in 
ensuring the right of women to be free from violence is tantamount to gender-based 
discrimination.  
¶23 In 2005, the CEDAW Committee heard a similar complaint in A.T. v. Hungary and, like 
the Commission, found that the state had failed to act with due diligence in providing the 
maximum protection of the law to victims of domestic violence.57 The petitioner described years 
of abuse from her former common law husband and argued that Hungarian authorities had failed 
to provide effective protection for her and her two children.58  
¶24 At the time, Hungary had no legal mechanism for obtaining protection or restraining 
orders, and the criminal proceedings that had been initiated against her partner had been 
dragging for years while he remained free.59 The petitioner could not leave her home because 
domestic violence shelters were not equipped to take in her disabled son. The petitioner alleged 
violations of Articles 2, 5, and 16 of CEDAW, which include the right to equality before the law, 
equality in marriage, and the duty of states to adopt measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women.60 Finally, the petitioner alleged that these same violations affect many Hungarian 
women, and she called for the CEDAW Committee to recommend changes in the Hungarian 
legal system to protect and support victims of domestic violence.61  
¶25 The CEDAW Committee determined that Hungary had indeed failed in its obligations 
under the articles cited by the petitioner.62 The CEDAW Committee pointed to Hungary’s own 
                                                 
51 Id. ¶ 56.  
52 Id. ¶ 60(2). 
53 Id.  
54 Id. ¶¶ 45-50. 
55 Id. ¶ 47. 
56 Id. ¶ 49. 
57 A.T. v. Hungary, CEDAW Comm., No. 2/2003, ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/decisions-
views/CEDAW%20Decision%20on%20AT%20vs%20Hungary%20English.pdf. 
58 Id. ¶ 3.1. 
59 Id. ¶¶ 3.1-3.2.  
60 CEDAW, supra note 15, art. 2, 5, 16.  
61 A.T., supra note 57, ¶ 3.4. 
62 Id. ¶¶ 9.2-9.3. 
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admissions that domestic violence cases do not enjoy high priority in court proceedings and that 
there was a lack of resources available to the petitioner, even at the time of her complaint to the 
CEDAW Committee.63 The CEDAW Committee concluded that the state’s inadequate response 
constituted a “violation of the author’s human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly her 
right to security of person.”64 Additionally, the CEDAW Committee commented that the state’s 
failure to act in this case was emblematic of the general attitude in Hungary regarding victims of 
domestic violence. Referencing a CEDAW country report from 2002, the CEDAW Committee 
noted there was concern about the “persistence of entrenched traditional stereotypes regarding 
the role and responsibilities of women and men in the family” in Hungary and that such a 
concern was borne out in this case.65  
¶26 The CEDAW Committee concluded by recommending that Hungary should immediately 
ensure that the petitioner and her two children will be secure and will receive services and 
support, including legal assistance, shelter, and potential reparations.66 The CEDAW Committee 
also recommended that, inter alia, Hungary should “[a]ssure victims of domestic violence the 
maximum protection of the law by acting with due diligence to prevent and respond to such 
violence against women” and “[i]nvestigate promptly, thoroughly, impartially and seriously all 
allegations of domestic violence and bring the offenders to justice in accordance with 
international standards.”67 In addition, the CEDAW Committee called for Hungary to 
“[i]mplement expeditiously and without delay” a prior recommendation to introduce a specific 
law “prohibiting domestic violence against women, which would provide for protection and 
exclusion orders.”68 The opinions and recommendations in these cases repeated many of the 
same provisions of other human rights instruments. In doing so, they reflected a growing 
consensus on the due diligence standard with increasingly clear guidelines on ensuring access to 
protection orders and prosecution. 
C. The Due Diligence Standard as Emerging Customary International Law 
¶27 In light of the growing coalescence of norms regarding violence against women, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan came out with a strongly-worded report on domestic violence and officially 
endorsed the “due diligence” standard in 2006. He drew on the rights guaranteed to women 
under a range of human rights treaties and declared that “violence against women is a form of 
discrimination and a violation of human rights.”69 The result of unchecked impunity for 
perpetrators “is not only denial of justice to the individual victims/survivors, but also 
reinforcement of prevailing inequalities that affect other women and girls as well.”70 
¶28 Also in 2006, the second Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Yakin Ertürk, 
issued an important report entitled “The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women,” which provided firm guidance on using the due diligence standard as 
the means of judging the efforts of states in addressing domestic violence and achieving justice 
                                                 
63 Id. ¶ 9.3. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. ¶ 9.4. 
66 Id. ¶ I(a)(b). 
67 Id. ¶¶ II (a), (b), (f), (g). 
68 Id. ¶ II(e). 
69 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ENDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FROM WORDS TO ACTION, U.N. Sales No. 
E.06.IV.8 (2006), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/VAW_Study/VAWstudyE.pdf. 
70 Id. at 6-7. 
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for victims. In her report, Ertürk provided a comprehensive survey of international law, including 
many of the human rights documents and cases outlined above, as evidence that there is “a rule 
of customary international law that obliges States to prevent and respond to acts of violence 
against women with due diligence.”71  
¶29  Ertürk echoed and reinforced the language of the due diligence standard, calling for states 
to “prevent, protect, prosecute and provide compensation and map out the parameters of 
responsibility for State and non-State actors alike in responding to violence.”72 In surveying 
national laws and international recommendations, Ertürk concluded that these basic principles – 
prevent, protect, prosecute, and redress – define the standard, and certain essential practical 
reforms can give effect to these principles. In terms of prevention, Ertürk encouraged the 
empowerment of women through education, skills training, legal literacy, and access to 
community resources that would encourage women’s self-reliance and allow them to negotiate 
“the terms of their existence in public and private spheres.”73  
¶30 The report also emphasized the importance of protective orders and noted that states are 
required to develop “appropriate legislative frameworks, policing systems and judicial 
procedures to provide adequate protection,” including “a safe and conducive environment for 
women to report acts of violence” and measures such as restraining or expulsion orders.74 Ertürk 
explained that “protection” has consistently taken the form of providing services such as 
telephone hotlines, health care, counseling centers, legal assistance, shelters, and financial aid to 
victims of violence.75  
¶31 Noting “major gaps in the enforcement of protective obligations,” Ertürk called for greater 
accountability and appropriate investigation and punishment of acts of violence against women.76 
As examples of meeting due diligence obligations, Ertürk pointed to states that have adopted 
specific legislation that articulates new criminal offenses and provides for the creation of special 
units for investigation and prosecution.77 She also suggested that states reinforce the “capacities 
and powers of police, prosecutors and magistrates” to respond effectively.78  In directly 
addressing the “punishment” facet of due diligence obligations, Ertürk noted that there are still 
“alarming numbers of instances of judges handing down reduced or inappropriate sentences for 
these crimes.”79 
¶32 By declaring the establishment of a rule of customary international law, Special 
Rapporteur Ertürk concluded that the due diligence standard had reached such a level of 
international consensus that it should be universally recognized and applied. Her suggested 
                                                 
71 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its 
Causes and Consequences, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence 
Against Women: The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, ¶ 29 (Jan. 
20, 2006) (prepared by Yakin Ertürk in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/41) 
[hereinafter 2006 Due Diligence Report]. 
72 Id. ¶ 103 (“The due diligence obligation of protection requires States to ensure that women and girls who are 
victims or at risk of violence have access to justice as well as to health care and support services that respond to their 
immediate needs, protect against further harm and continue to address the ongoing consequences of violence for 
individual woman.”); id. ¶ 82. 
73 Id. ¶ 80. 
74 Id. ¶ 82. 
75 Id. ¶ 47. 
76 Id. ¶¶ 49, 50. 
77 Id. ¶ 50. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. ¶ 54. 
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provisions clarified the obligations of a state, but application of the due diligence standard in 
international tribunals will continue to shape the practical dimensions of these obligations. 
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
¶33  The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has incorporated the due diligence 
standard and issued several rulings that indicate authoritative minimums for compliance. This 
development began with the ECHR’s recognition of state responsibility for non-state actors in 
meeting obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. A decade later, the 
ECHR issued two landmark decisions, Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria and Opuz v. Turkey, which 
acknowledged and applied the emerging due diligence standard in the context of domestic 
violence.80 In addition to establishing precedential standards for member states of the European 
Union, the ECHR’s opinions have attained a high level of authority in international human rights 
law and have a major role in shaping emerging human rights norms. Thus, the recently-decided 
cases in the application of the due diligence standard not only reflect a consensus, but also will 
serve as a catalyst for further progress in the ECHR and beyond. 
A. Formal Recognition of State Responsibility by the ECHR 
¶34 In 1998, the ECHR formally recognized the potential of state responsibility for private acts 
in Osman v. United Kingdom.81 Similar to the IACHR’s decision in Velasquez Rodriguez, the 
ECHR explicitly acknowledged that a state’s obligation “extends beyond its primary duty to 
secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the 
commission of offenses against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions.”82 The Court established 
criteria for finding a violation of the positive obligation to protect life, noting that it must be 
shown that the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a “real 
and immediate risk” and that they failed to “take measures within the scope of their powers 
which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.”83 This opinion joined 
those in the IACHR and the CEDAW Committee in finding that a state can be found complicit in 
human rights abuses perpetuated by non-state actors.  
¶35 Several years later, the ECHR issued a ruling in M.C. v. Bulgaria that affirmed and 
strengthened the state responsibility standards it had set out in Osman.84 In M.C., a young 
woman filed a complaint with the police accusing two men of rape. A prosecutor authorized an 
initial investigation, but dropped the inquiry after finding that the use of force or threats in the 
commission of the rape had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, as was required by 
law at the time.85 In the victim’s subsequent appeals, no weight was given to her argument that 
she was unwilling but unable to resist due to shock and fear.86 Before the ECHR, the young 
woman alleged violations of several European Convention articles, including Article 3, which 
guarantees freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 8, which states that 
                                                 
80 Bevacqua & S. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 12, 2008); Opuz, supra note 7. 
81 Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124.  
82 Id. ¶ 115.  
83 Id. ¶ 116.  
84 M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
85 Id. ¶¶ 61, 64.  
86 Id. ¶ 60.  
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every person “has the right to respect for his private and family life,” Article 13, which 
guarantees and effective remedy for those whose rights have been violated, and Article 14, which 
guarantees equal protection of rights enumerated in the Convention.87  
¶36 The Court affirmed Osman’s holding that a state has a positive obligation to secure respect 
for private life under Article 8, here extending “respect for private life” to apply to the violations 
suffered by the young woman. The Court found that although “the choice of means to secure 
compliance … is in principle within the State’s margin of appreciation, effective deterrence 
against grave acts such as rape, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are 
at stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions.”88 The Court found that Article 3 “gives rise 
to a positive obligation to conduct an official investigation” and that under Article 8, the Court 
may assess the effectiveness of such an investigation.89  
¶37 Of particular relevance, the Court found that Bulgaria was in violation of Article 8 because 
the investigators and prosecutors failed in meeting their positive obligations as viewed "in light 
of the relevant modern standards in comparative and international law.”90 Earlier in the opinion, 
when discussing how the definition of rape under international law no longer requires the victim 
to prove force or threats, the Court referenced the law of surrounding nations, case law from the 
ICTY and ICTR, the Recommendation Rec(2005)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe (“2002 Recommendation”), and General Recommendation 19.91 In addition, the Court 
acknowledged that a state’s “margin of appreciation” is limited by the provisions of the 
European Convention and that the Court “must have regard to the changing conditions within 
Contracting States and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to 
be achieved.”92 Thus, based on evidence of emerging standards, the Court found that states have 
a positive obligation to first enact criminal-law provisions that criminalize non-consensual sex 
and then “apply them in practice through investigation and prosecution.”93 In this way, the Court 
affirmed its practice of considering the European Convention a “living” document to be read in 
light of emerging human rights norms – a practice which would be reflected in the Court’s 
decisions in Bevacqua and S. v.  Bulgaria and Opuz v. Turkey.  
B. Articulation of a Framework for Meeting the Due Diligence Standard in the ECHR 
¶38  In 2002, prior to Special Rapporteur Ertürk’s landmark report codifying “due diligence” 
as a tool to assess a nation’s progress in addressing domestic violence,  the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe94 adopted a recommendation to its forty-seven member states 
                                                 
87 Id. ¶¶ 3, 109-110; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Feb. 28, 
1996, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol 11 to The European Convention on Human Rights, 33 I.L.M. 943, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter European Convention]. 
88 M.C., supra note 84, ¶ 150. 
89 Id. ¶ 152, citing Osman, supra note 81. 
90 Id. ¶ 185.  
91 Id. ¶¶ 88-108. In citing General Recommendation 19, the Court quoted the language in paragraph 24 which 
encouraged states to ensure that laws against “abuse, rape, sexual assault, and other gender-based violence give 
adequate protection to all women, and respect their integrity and dignity.” Id. ¶ 108. 
92 Id. ¶ 155.  
93 Id. ¶ 153.   
94 Founded on May 5, 1949, by 10 countries, the Council of Europe seeks to develop throughout Europe common 
and democratic principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts on the 
protection of individuals. The Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe's decision-making body, comprised 
of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the member states, or their permanent diplomatic representatives in 
Strasbourg.  
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regarding the protection of women against violence. The 2002 Recommendation recognized the 
emerging due diligence standard and common practices used to combat violence against women 
in the family as a means of providing explicit guidance to member states.95 The 2002 
Recommendation incorporated the language and principles that had been evolving worldwide, 
including express references to DEVAW, CEDAW, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
and the International Criminal Court’s recognition of gender-related war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.96 Significantly, the 2002 Recommendation articulates the due diligence 
standard affirmed by the Special Rapporteur and others, noting that member states should 
“[r]ecognise that states have an obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and 
punish acts of violence, whether those acts are perpetrated by the state or private persons, and 
provide protection to victims.”97 
¶39  The 2002 Recommendation articulates specific measures that member states ought to 
implement to exercise due diligence. Although it allows for implementation in a manner 
“appropriate in the light of national circumstances and preferences,”98 the 2002 Recommendation 
identifies several “necessary” provisions, including public education, media training, treatment 
and assistance for victims, intervention for the perpetrators of violence, as well as particular 
reforms to criminal law, civil law, and judicial proceedings.99   By further outlining explicit legal 
provisions, the 2002 Recommendation offers tangible benchmarks for Council of Europe 
member states to use in guiding national policy related to protection, investigation, and 
prosecution.  
¶40 Protection provisions include timely and appropriate responses by specially-trained law 
enforcement officers to requests for assistance,100 confidentiality in handling victim complaints, 
and mechanisms to obtain measures of protection. Specific guidance on the provision of 
protection orders calls for states to enable the judiciary to arrange interim measures to bar the 
perpetrator from “contacting, communicating with or approaching the victim [or] residing in or 
entering certain defined areas” and penalize “all breaches of the measures” imposed on 
perpetrators.101 Furthermore, measures should be taken to protect victims against threats or 
revenge following complaints102 and enable the police to enter residences to arrest perpetrators of 
violence.103  
¶41 To better prosecute perpetrators, states should classify all forms of violence within the 
family as criminal offenses104 and ensure that proceedings can be initiated by both the victim and 
the public prosecutor.105 In addition to providing for public prosecution, the 2002 
Recommendation encourages prosecutors to regard violence against women as an aggravating 
factor in deciding whether or not to prosecute in the public interest.106 The Recommendation also 
                                                 
95 Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation Rec (2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
protection of women against violence, 794th Sess. (April 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Equality/PDF_Rec(2002)5_E.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Recommendation]. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. § II.  
98 Id. § VIII. 
99 Id. ¶¶ 6-49. 
100 Id. ¶ 29. 
101 Id. ¶ 58(b), (f). 
102 Id. ¶ 44. 
103 Id. ¶ 58(a). 
104 Id. ¶ 55. 
105 Id. ¶¶ 38, 39. 
106 Id. ¶ 44. 
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calls on governments to revise and increase penalties for deliberate assault and battery 
committed within the family as well as ensure punishment for all violence and killings in the 
name of “honor.”107 
¶42 Lastly, the 2002 Recommendation suggests providing some form of compensation for 
damages suffered, based on degree of gravity,108 and granting immigrant victims of domestic 
violence an independent right to residence so they can leave their abusers without having to 
leave their new home countries.109 In addition to broader international recommendations, this 
Europe-centered instrument established a framework for judging compliance with the due 
diligence standard in cases arising out of the Council of Europe’s member states. 
C. Consequences for Failing to Meet the Due Diligence Standard  
¶43 With this history as a context, the ECHR considered the cases of Bevacqua and S. v. 
Bulgaria and Opuz v. Turkey. Decided in 2008 and 2009, these two cases signify a turning point 
for the ECHR and international law. The Court’s decisions recognize and advance the due 
diligence standard in the context of domestic violence.  Specifically, they enumerate several 
identifiable minimums which give practical substance to judging a state’s adherence to the 
principles of protection, investigation, and prosecution. These minimums include the existence of 
a judicial mechanism for obtaining protection measures, such as orders of protection, and the 
availability of prosecution in the public interest for all crimes of domestic violence. Furthermore, 
as declared in Opuz v. Turkey, the Court will recognize a state’s failure to exercise due diligence 
as gender-based discrimination.  
1. Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria  
¶44 Although there are no official statistics on the prevalence of domestic violence in Bulgaria, 
the U.S. State Department reported in 2007 that police believed one out of every four women had 
been a victim.110 Valentina Nickolaeva Bevacqua, the applicant in this case, was one such victim. 
She argued that Bulgarian government officials had violated her right to respect for private and 
family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention by failing to take the 
necessary measures to provide an adequate legal framework that would protect her and her 
young son from the violent behavior of her former husband.111  She also challenged the relevant 
Bulgarian law governing prosecution of crimes of bodily harm, its disproportionate and 
discriminatory impact on women, and its trivialization of domestic violence as a private family 
matter.112 Valentina ultimately prevailed in her first claim, as the ECHR held that Bulgaria had 
not exercised due diligence to protect and investigate the violence against her. 
                                                 
107 Id. ¶¶ 56, 80. 
108 Id. ¶ 36. 
109 Id. ¶ 59. 
110 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN BULGARIA, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE: BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND LABOR (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100552.htm. Bulgaria is a country 
of nearly 7.8 million people, with 2.5 million women between the ages of 15 and 64. Id. However, in 2006, the 
courts reviewed only 2,092 domestic violence complaints. Id. This small number of complaints relative to the 
percentage of women likely experiencing abuse illustrates how infrequently domestic violence is even officially 
reported. See also 2008 BULGARIA REPORT, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bu.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2008).  
111 Bevacqua, supra note 6, ¶ 65. 
112 Id. ¶ 63. 
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a) Facts of the Case 
¶45 Valentina filed for divorce from her husband, Mr. N., in March of 2000 and left her home 
with her young son. She alleged that her husband had abused her and filed a request for an 
interim custody order.113 However, it was not until May of 2001 that Valentina was able to 
finalize her divorce and obtain a court determination of custody issues.114 In the meantime, 
Valentina experienced multiple incidents of physical abuse at the hands of Mr. N., often when he 
forcibly removed their son from her home.115 Following such incidents, Valentina obtained 
medical documentation, filed complaints with the prosecutor’s office, and continued to file 
requests for interim custody measures for her son.116 However, indifference and delay 
characterized the response of local law enforcement: police took more than a month to issue a 
warning to Mr. N. for the first instance of child abduction; the courts did not address Valentina’s  
requests for interim measures and enforced a two-month “reconciliation period” prior to the 
divorce proceeding.117 Furthermore, complaints to the Ministry of the Interior about the lack of 
police and judicial response to her safety concerns resulted only in a letter indicating that the 
Ministry had examined the matter and concluded that the police had exhausted all their options, 
and the remaining issues constituted a private dispute.118   
¶46 When the divorce proceedings finally began, there were six months of delays based on 
such seemingly trivial matters as Mr. N.’s challenge to the registered status of the non-
governmental organization where the applicant sought assistance and therapy.119 In the end, the 
court found that both parties were responsible for the failed marriage and both were good 
parents, despite the testimony of a Social Care officer that the child was afraid of his father 
because he had battered his mother.120 However, custody was granted to Valentina on the basis 
of the child’s young age. Following an appeal by Mr. N., custody was confirmed in March of 
2002, this time with recognition of evidence that Mr. N. had battered the applicant.  
¶47 When Valentina and two friends went to collect belongings from Mr. N’s apartment in 
June of 2002, he battered her once again. She visited a doctor who recorded evidence of bruises 
on her face, arm, and hip, and she again complained to prosecution authorities. However, local 
prosecutors issued no decisions until months later, when they refused to initiate criminal 
proceedings against Mr. N. The prosecutors noted that under Bulgarian law, it was open to the 
applicant to bring private prosecution proceedings since her injuries fell into the category of 
“light bodily injuries,” as opposed to “serious” or “medium.”121  
                                                 
113 Id. ¶ 7. 
114 Id. ¶¶ 33-34. 
115 Id. ¶¶ 11-18, 21, 22-23.  
116 Id.  
117 Id. Of particular relevance, the Bulgarian Supreme Court had previously held that no interim measures regarding 
custody should be ordered during a mandatory two-month reconciliation period unless the interest of the child 
requires it and where delay may adversely affect the child’s development and upbringing. Id. ¶ 40. 
118 Id. ¶ 24. 
119 Id. ¶¶ 29-30. 
120 Id. ¶¶ 33-34. 
121 Id ¶¶ 33-38. Under the guidelines of the Bulgarian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal 
proceedings regarding bodily harm are divided into categories depending on the “serious”, “medium” or “light” 
nature of the injury. The Penal Code provides specific definitions of each level. Bulgarian courts have held that 
facial bruises, a broken nose and head contusions without loss of consciousness are examples of light bodily harm. 
Id. ¶ 45 (citing Bulgarian Supreme Court interpretive circular ППBC № 3, 27.11.1979). Serious bodily harm 
includes injuries which cause: mental disorder; continuous blindness of either or both eyes; permanent deafness; loss 
of speech; generative disability; disfigurement when it causes permanent disorder of the speech or of a sense organ; 
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¶48 According to the Bulgarian Penal Code at the time, when “medium bodily harm” or “light 
bodily harm” was inflicted by a spouse or other family member, criminal proceedings had to be 
initiated by the victim rather than a public prosecutor.122 However, when “medium bodily harm” 
was inflicted by a stranger, the public prosecutor could to initiate proceedings. Where criminal 
proceedings are initiated by the victim, he or she acts as private prosecutor, and proceedings are 
discontinued if the victim fails to appear in court.123 In this case, the applicant did not pursue 
private prosecution of Mr. N. beyond her initial complaints to prosecuting authorities.124 
b) The Court’s Judgment 
¶49 Before the ECHR, Valentina argued that the Bulgarian authorities failed to intervene and 
assist her and her son pursuant to their obligations under Articles 3, 8, 13, and 14 of the 
European Convention. In addition, she argued that the Bulgarian Penal Code’s requirement that a 
spouse initiate criminal proceedings for light and medium bodily injury was incompatible with 
the rights guaranteed in these Articles.125 In considering the case, the Court not only reviewed 
domestic law and ECHR case law, but also incorporated other supporting international material, 
including the Special Rapporteur’s report on using the due diligence standard as a tool. This 
inclusion not only indicates the report’s influence on the Court, but also the gives the report 
additional credibility as a universal legal standard.  
¶50 In its review of Bulgarian law, the Court referenced the relevant provisions of the domestic 
Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure.126 The Court also 
referred to a Child Protection Act passed in 2000 that created a State Child Protection Agency 
that, as of February 2001, was empowered to order protection measures for children in danger.127 
                                                                                                                                                             
loss of one kidney, the spleen or a branch of the lung; loss or crippling of a leg or a hand; permanent general health 
disorder that endangers life. Penal Code, at art. 128, reprinted in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK [State Gazette] (2005) 
(Bulg.), available at http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/330B548F-7504-433A-BE65-
5686B7D7FCBB/0/04_Penal_Code_EN.pdf [hereinafter Penal Code]. Medium or “average” bodily harm includes 
injury which causes: a permanent weakening of sight or hearing; permanent speech difficulty, difficulty in moving 
limbs, the body or neck, impairment of the functions of the genitals without causing generative disability; breaking 
of the jaw or knocking out teeth where speech or chewing is then impeded, disfiguring of the face or other parts of 
the body; permanent health disorder that does not endanger life or a health disorder which temporarily endangers 
life; injuries penetrating the skull, the chest and the abdominal cavity. Id. at art. 129. Light bodily harm is defined as 
a resulting health disorder not covered by the above categories or, with a corresponding lesser criminal sentence, 
demonstrated pain and suffering without a health disorder. Id. at art. 130. 
122 Penal Code, supra note 121, at art. 161.  
123 Bevacqua, supra note 6, ¶¶ 44-46. See also Criminal Procedure Code, reprinted in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK [State 
Gazette] (2005) (Bulg.), available at 
http://www.mjeli.government.bg/Npk/docs/CRIMINAL_PROCEDURE_CODE.pdf.  
124 Bevacqua, supra note 6, ¶ 81. The applicant did report abuse to prosecution authorities, but this does not mean 
she had initiated criminal proceedings. In some cases, prosecutors become involved informally and issue warnings 
to the spouse and record the warning, but take no further action. These warnings, however, are not used as a basis for 
prosecution nor are they used as evidence against a batterer in court if the abuse continues. MINNESOTA ADVOCATES 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN BULGARIA 15 (1996), available at: 
http://www.mnadvocates.org/sites/608a3887-dd53-4796-8904-997a0131ca54/uploads/bulgaria.PDF. 
125 Bevacqua, supra note 6, ¶ 63. The applicant had also argued under Article 6 that the length of custody 
proceedings violated her and her son’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The Court’s final holding 
determined that the length of the custody proceedings, as a civil matter, did not violate Article 6 of the European 
Convention. Id. ¶ 93. According to the Court, Article 6 guarantees that everyone is entitled to a hearing within a 
“reasonable time” regarding civil rights and obligations. Id. ¶ 85.The Court reasoned that while they did take into 
account the length of proceedings with regard to the applicant’s Article 8 claims, in a purely civil custody dispute 
setting, the length was not unreasonable. Id. ¶¶ 91-93. 
126 Id. ¶¶ 39-46. 
127 Id. ¶ 47. 
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In addition, the Court considered the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act enacted in 
March 2005 whereby courts are now authorized to issue injunctions to remove a perpetrator from 
a common home, bar him from approaching a victim, and temporarily remove a child from his 
custody.128  
¶51 Following its review of Bulgarian law, the Court turned immediately to documents and law 
that address the issue of domestic violence internationally and in Europe. Among the 
international materials it discussed were DEVAW and Special Rapporteur Ertürk’s report of 
2006. The Court referred to these documents in its discussion of the due diligence principle and 
its acknowledgement of the Rapporteur’s conclusion that there exists a rule of customary 
international law that obliges states to prevent and respond to acts of violence against women.129 
The Court also referenced the developing case law, including Osman v. the United Kingdom, 
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes (Brazil), and A.T. v. 
Hungary.130 In two brief paragraphs, the ECHR incorporated into its findings the extensive 
international foundation for due diligence obligations regarding domestic violence.  
¶52 The Court relied heavily on the 2002 Recommendation.131 It summarized several of the 
key points: 
Member states should ensure that all victims of violence are able to institute 
proceedings, make provisions to ensure that criminal proceedings can be initiated 
by the public prosecutors, encourage prosecutors to regard violence against 
women as an aggravating or decisive factor in deciding whether or not to 
prosecute in the public interest, ensure where necessary that measures are taken to 
protect victims effectively against threats and possible acts of revenge and take 
specific measures to ensure that children’s rights are protected during 
proceedings.132  
¶53 The Court also referenced the recommendation that all states should take steps to ensure 
that the judiciary can authorize interim measures and protection orders that would be punishable 
by law if violated.133  
¶54  Lastly, the Court turned to relevant law from the European Convention, focusing on 
Article 8 as the provision Bulgaria potentially violated. Article 8 guarantees the right to respect 
for private and family life without “interference by a public authority…except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.”134 The Court noted that Article 8 had previously been interpreted to encompass “positive 
obligations inherent in effective ‘respect’ for private and family life and these obligations may 
involve the adoption of measures in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves.” Since the concept of “private life” includes a person’s “physical and psychological 
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integrity,” these positive obligations may include a “duty to maintain and apply in practice an 
adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals.”135  
¶55  Upon its review, the Court held that “the authorities’ failure to impose sanctions or 
otherwise enforce Mr. N.’s obligation to refrain from unlawful acts was critical” in this case and 
it “amounted to a refusal to provide the immediate assistance the applicant needed.”136 Measures 
to obtain protection such as those recommended by the Committee of Ministers or those recently 
introduced in Bulgaria’s 2005 Protection Against Domestic Violence Act would have been 
necessary to protect the personal integrity of the applicant and her son.137 However, in this case, 
the Court did not find that the failure of the prosecutor to bring charges against Mr. N. was a 
violation of the European Convention. 
i) Requiring Measures of Protection 
¶56 In reviewing the facts of Mr. N’s behavior, the Court found that the “measures taken by the 
police and prosecuting authorities on the basis of their general powers did not prove effective” 
and that improved administrative and policing measures like those later enunciated in the 
Bulgarian Domestic Violence Act of 2005 were necessary.138 Specifically, the Act allows for 
emergency measures, an order to remove the abuser from the home, a traditional restraining 
order prohibiting contact, and temporary relocation of a child with the parent petitioner.139 Thus, 
the Court’s decision establishes a particular mechanism—enforced protection orders—as a 
minimum requirement for compliance with due diligence obligations.  
ii) Failing to Condemn the Lack of Public Prosecution   
¶57 In arguing that the State had failed to address immediate threats to her and her son, 
Valentina asserted that the Penal Code, which places the burden on the victim of domestic 
violence to prosecute for “medium” and “light” bodily injury, was “incompatible with the State’s 
duty to provide protection against domestic violence and was discriminatory in that the law’s 
shortcomings impacted disproportionately on women.”140 Essentially, the applicant argued that 
such a law continued to treat the issue of domestic violence as a “private” matter not worthy of 
public prosecution.141  
¶58 In its decision, the Court did not find that the Penal Code’s requirement of a victim to act 
as private prosecutor was a violation of Convention rights under Article 8.  Instead, the Court 
applied the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, which extends states some latitude for meeting the 
Convention’s requirements using preferred national policies and procedures.142  Specifically, the 
Court held that “the choice of a means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls within the domestic 
authorities’ margin of appreciation.”143 
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¶59 However, the Court suggested that this topic was not closed to future litigation. In its 
summary of the 2002 Recommendation, the Court had noted that it called for all member nations 
to “make provisions to ensure that criminal proceedings can be initiated by the public 
prosecutors.”144 Here, the Court merely rejected the applicant’s argument that her Convention 
rights could be secured only with state-assisted prosecution and that such prosecution was 
required in all cases of domestic violence.145 According to the most recent version of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, in “exceptional” cases, the prosecutor may initiate proceedings upon a 
finding that the complainant “cannot defend his or her rights and lawful interests due to [a] state 
of helplessness or dependency upon the perpetrator of the crime.”146 Where the prosecutor 
initiates proceedings, the case will not be terminated if the victim fails to appear in court.147 
Since prosecutors can choose to step in for “exceptional” cases under Bulgarian law, the Court 
may have tried to limit its decision in this case. Still, the Court observed that despite its ruling, 
Bulgarian law “may be found, in certain circumstances, to raise an issue of compatibility with 
the Convention.”148  
¶60 This is especially true given the reality of the process a victim of domestic violence must 
face if she wishes to prosecute her abuser on her own.  In a report from 1996, the Minnesota 
Advocates for Human Rights found that in making her case, a victim of domestic violence in 
Bulgaria must obtain a medical certificate from the Department of Criminal Medicine 
documenting her injuries.149 The reviewing physician must then categorize the injury as serious, 
medium, or light.150 In this way, the physician makes a legal determination that influences the 
outcome of the criminal action before the victim ever goes to court. The victim must also find 
her own witnesses, and, although she can ask the state prosecutor or the judge to help, they are 
not obligated to do so.151 The report also noted the observations of a Regional Court judge who 
explained that police officers frequently do not cooperate when the victim asks for their 
testimony.152 This judge explained that she often must call police supervisors herself to request 
that the investigating officers cooperate as witnesses at the trials of perpetrators of domestic 
violence.153 Additionally, the report found that even when a woman is able to obtain a 
conviction, the abuser likely receives little or no punishment.154   
iii) Failing to Consider Discrimination under Article 14 
¶61 The Court did not address the applicant’s Article 14 claim regarding the discriminatory 
effects of the Criminal Code provisions on female victims of domestic violence.155 As discussed 
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above, Article 14 guarantees that the rights enumerated in the European Convention “shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground,” including gender.156 In its survey of international 
law, the Court did not specifically point to the issue of gender-based discrimination in finding a 
violation of the Convention, despite the inclusion of Article 14 in the applicant’s complaint. 
However, one of the instruments the Court cited in its survey of laws was DEVAW, which 
recognizes domestic violence as "a manifestation of historically unequal power relationships 
between men and women" and condemns the violence as one of the "crucial social mechanisms 
by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men."157  
¶62 As it currently stands, the practical result of the Bulgarian Criminal Code is discrimination. 
If a woman is stabbed with a knife by a stranger on the street and is categorized as receiving 
“medium” bodily harm—harm that does not result in death or permanent injury—the state can 
prosecute the attacker. However, if the same woman is stabbed in her home by her husband and 
receives the same injuries, the state will prosecute in the public interest only in “exceptional” 
cases. In the words of a prosecutor interviewed in 1996, "‘a woman must decide for herself 
whether she wants to harm the family relationship through prosecution, the state will not damage 
the family by assisting her.’"158 Such a law yet again reflects the notion that violence in the 
family—violence that disproportionately impacts women—is a private issue, and prosecution is 
usually not in the “public” interest.  
2. Opuz v. Turkey 
¶63 Nahide Opuz, the applicant in this case, as well as her mother, endured years of physical 
abuse and threats from Nahide’s husband (“H.O.”), who eventually killed her mother. Nahide 
and her mother had complained to law enforcement authorities on numerous occasions, but the 
authorities had done little in response. Nahide argued that the ineffectiveness of the Turkish 
authorities had violated her mother’s right to life under Article 2 and her own right to be free 
from torture and ill-treatment under Article 3. She also contended that the inadequate response 
by law enforcement was a result of gender-based discrimination and thus a violation of Article 
14.  In deciding the case, the Court observed that “a crucial question…is whether the local 
authorities displayed due diligence to prevent violence against the applicant and her mother, in 
particular by pursuing criminal or other appropriate preventive measures against H.O. despite the 
withdrawal of complaints by the victims.”159 The Court’s historic judgment found that there had 
indeed been violations and that Turkey had failed to exercise due diligence in providing effective 
protection measures and prosecution. 
a) Facts of the Case 
¶64 Nahide’s mother married A.O., and Nahide started a relationship with A.O.’s son, H.O., in 
1990.  Nahide and H.O. had three children, and they were officially married in 1995. The Court’s 
opinion in the case describes numerous incidents of serious harassment, abuse, and violence 
perpetrated against Nahide and her mother by both A.O. and H.O., including the murder of 
                                                                                                                                                             
it is (b) intentionally inflicted, (c) for specified purposes and (d) with some form of official involvement, whether 
active or passive.” Id. 
156 European Convention, supra note 87, art. 14.  
157 DEVAW, supra note 35.  
158 MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 11. The report also noted that “a representative 
of the National Police acknowledged that police do not pay much attention to ‘domestic disputes.’" Id. at 14. 
159 Opuz, supra note 7, ¶ 131. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 1 0  
 210
Nahide’s mother by H.O. in 2002. Even as the complaint was being heard in the ECHR, H.O. 
continued to threaten Nahide’s safety.160  
¶65  In its opinion, the Court reviewed the history of H.O.’s violent relationship with his wife 
and mother-in-law. In 1995, H.O. beat Nahide and threatened her with death.161 She complained 
to the public prosecutor but later withdrew her complaint. According to the criminal code in 
place at the time, this removed the basis for the proceedings, and the case had to be dropped.162 
In 1996, H.O. beat Nahide, and the injuries were considered life-threatening; the public 
prosecutor filed charges, but after H.O. was released pending trial, Nahide withdrew her 
complaint. The magistrate’s court found that the offense fell under the same criminal code 
provision as the previous injury and that the withdrawal of the victim’s complaint required 
dismissal.163 In 1998, H.O. threatened and injured Nahide with a knife, but in this case the public 
prosecutor cited insufficient evidence to prove a knife assault and determined there was no 
public interest in the case since the victim could pursue a private lawsuit for battery.164 That 
same year, H.O. drove a car into Nahide and her mother, causing life-threatening injuries to her 
mother.165 The public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings while the applicant asked for 
protective measures and filed for divorce. After 25 days in jail, H.O. was released pending trial. 
The applicant and her mother subsequently dropped their complaints, and the applicant moved 
back in with H.O. Nonetheless, the prosecutor continued to pursue the case, and several months 
later H.O. was sentenced to three months imprisonment for causing serious injuries to his 
mother-in-law. However, his sentence was then commuted to a mere monetary fine.166  
¶66  In 2001, H.O. stabbed Nahide seven times, turned himself in along with the knife used, 
and confessed.167 He was released after giving his statement and, after considerable effort on the 
part of the Nahide’s lawyer, the prosecutor charged him with knife assault. Six months later, he 
received as his penalty a fine that he could pay in eight installments.168 Throughout 2001, Nahide 
and her mother complained to the prosecutor about death threats from H.O. and A.O. Nahide’s 
mother alleged that H.O. wandered around her property with knives and guns.169 After Nahide’s 
mother pleaded to the prosecutor that her own life was in immediate danger from H.O., the 
prosecutor made a request for future phone records, but did nothing else.170 Finally, in 2002, 
Nahide’s mother made plans to move away with her daughter. As she climbed into a moving 
truck loaded with furniture, H.O. confronted her and shot her to death.171 
¶67 Following the killing, the prosecutor filed an indictment, and H.O. was arrested. H.O. 
claimed he killed his mother-in-law for the sake of his honor and his children because she had 
induced his wife to lead an immoral life.172 Six years later, in 2008, H.O. was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; however, because the court found that he had 
committed the offense as a result of provocation, and he had conducted himself well during the 
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trial, his sentence was reduced to 15 years and a fine. The court allowed him to be released 
pending his appeal.173 After his release, Nahide again asked for protective measures, as H.O. 
stalked her and threatened her boyfriend.174 Only with continued prodding by the ECHR were 
any protection measures implemented: the government distributed photos of H.O. to local police 
agencies with orders to arrest him if he was found near the applicant. 
b) The Court’s Judgment 
¶68 In reaching a judgment, the Court reviewed the relevant law, as it had in Bevacqua. The 
Court looked to the Turkish Criminal Code and the Family Protection Act (Law No. 4320) that 
was passed in 1998.175 The Court also relied on relevant international and comparative law, 
including sources discussed throughout this paper and in the Bevacqua opinion.176 Significantly, 
the Court again referenced Special Rapporteur Ertürk’s 2006 report on the due diligence standard 
and quoted her conclusion that there is a rule of customary international law that “’obliges States 
to prevent and respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence.’”177 Furthermore, 
in referencing the 2002 Recommendation, the Court used the same language as it had in 
Bevacqua to summarize and reinforce the suggested measures states should take in addressing 
violence against women.178  
¶69 However, unlike in Bevacqua, the Court did not make its findings based on Article 8’s 
protections of the right to personal integrity. Instead, the Court found that Turkey had violated 
Nahide’s mother’s right to life under Articles 2 and the applicant’s right to be free from torture 
or ill-treatment under Article 3, and that the failure to exercise due diligence in securing these 
rights stemmed from gender-based discrimination in violation of Article 14. With these landmark 
holdings, the Court continued its work from Bevacqua in solidifying a state’s obligation to 
enable victims of abuse to obtain protection orders and enable prosecutors to bring charges in the 
public interest. 
i) Exercising Due Diligence in Protecting the Right to Life  
¶70  The Court first addressed Nahide’s charge that Article 2 of the European Convention had 
been violated when Turkey failed to exercise due diligence in protecting the life of her mother. 
Article 2 provides that everyone’s “right to life shall be protected by law,”179 and the applicant 
argued that despite numerous complaints to the public prosecutor’s office, no protective 
measures were taken for her or her mother, even after the Family Protection Act was in effect.180 
In assessing Turkey’s responsibility, the Court recalled that positive obligations arise when it is 
established that authorities knew or ought to have known of a “real and immediate risk to the life 
of an identified individual” and that they failed to take measures within their powers that might 
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have avoided the risk.181 Based on H.O.’s history, the Court found that it was “obvious” he posed 
a significant risk of further violence.182 Furthermore, the Turkish criminal law system “did not 
have an adequate deterrent effect capable of ensuring the effective prevention of the unlawful 
acts committed by H.O.”183  
¶71 The Court criticized the fact that H.O. often escaped criminal prosecution and faced lenient 
sentences when he was convicted, including the lower court’s sentence mitigation because he 
killed her mother to protect his honor.184 Turkey’s legislative framework at the time required 
official complaints by victims to pursue criminal investigations when criminal acts did not result 
in sickness or unfitness for work for ten days or more.185 The Court found this legislative 
framework “fell short of the requirements inherent in the State’s positive obligations to establish 
and apply effectively a system punishing all forms of domestic violence and providing sufficient 
safeguards for the victims.”186 Referring to comparative law material from other European states 
regarding the power of prosecutors to continue criminal proceedings, the Court observed that 
there were certain factors a prosecutor could consider when deciding to pursue prosecution in the 
public interest.187 These factors include:  
the seriousness of the offence; whether the victim’s injuries are physical or 
psychological; if the defendant used a weapon; if the defendant has made any 
threats since the attack; if the defendant planned the attack; the effect (including 
psychological) on any children living in the household; the chances of the 
defendant offending again; the continuing threat to the health and safety of the 
victim or anyone else who was, or could become, involved; the current state of the 
victim’s relationship with the defendant; the effect on that relationship of 
continuing with the prosecution against the victim’s wishes; the history of the 
relationship, particularly if there had been any other violence in the past; and the 
defendant’s criminal history, particularly any previous violence.”188 
¶72 Based on this comparative analysis, the Court inferred that the more serious the offense or 
the greater the risk of further offenses, the more likely it is that the prosecution will continue in 
the public interest, even in cases where the victims withdraw their complaints.189 The Court 
noted that Nahide and her mother always withdrew their complaints when H.O. was at liberty or 
following his release from custody.190 The Turkish government had argued that interfering with 
their wishes would have resulted in a violation of victim rights under Article 8. However, in 
response, the Court referred to the decisions in Bevacqua and reiterated that in some instances 
interference may be necessary to protect the health and rights of others or to prevent criminal 
acts. In this case, “[t]he seriousness of the risk to the applicant’s mother rendered such 
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intervention by the authorities necessary.”191 The Court observed that law enforcement officers 
could have responded more thoroughly, and judges could have ordered protective measures even 
if the victims had not requested them.192  
¶73 Significantly, the Court concluded that, given the seriousness of H.O.’s crimes, the 
prosecuting authorities should have been able to pursue prosecution as a matter of public interest, 
even when the victims withdrew their complaints. Failure to do so before the applicant’s mother 
was killed deprived her of her life and safety,193 and the Court suggested that the authorities’ 
failure to respond promptly to the killing after it happened created “the appearance of tolerance 
of unlawful acts.”194 [Note that the Court did not actually connect “failure to respond promptly” 
to “the appearance of tolerance of unlawful acts” in paragraph 150.]  In light of these failures, 
Turkish national authorities “cannot be considered to have displayed due diligence.”195  The 
Court suggested that these failures could have been remedied with use of protection orders and 
prosecution in the public interest. 
ii) Exercising Due Diligence in Preventing Torture and Ill-treatment  
¶74 After finding the violation of Article 2, the Court also found a violation of Article 3, which 
articulates the right to be free from torture or degrading treatment or punishment.196 The Court 
held that this violation resulted from “State authorities’ failure to take protective measures in the 
form of effective deterrence against serious breaches of the applicant’s personal integrity by her 
husband.”197 Under Article 3, ill-treatment must reach a certain level of severity, but this 
minimum is relative to the circumstances of the case, the nature and context of the treatment, its 
duration, physical, and mental effects, and sometimes, the sex, age, and health of the victim.198 In 
this instance, the Court concluded that the violence from which Nahide suffered, “in the form of 
physical injuries and psychological pressure,” was “sufficiently serious” to amount to ill-
treatment, especially given the vulnerable situation of women in south-east Turkey.199 Notably, 
in finding that domestic violence can rise to the level of ill-treatment, the Court looked for 
“consensus and common values emerging from the practices of European States and specialised 
international instruments,” such as CEDAW and the Convention of Belém Do Pará, which 
recognize the “evolution of norms and principles in international law” and specifically set out 
states’ duties relating to eradication of gender-based violence.200  
¶75 Ultimately, the Court found that none of the meager measures taken by authorities were 
sufficient to stop H.O. from perpetrating further violence.  Until January 1998, when the Family 
Protection Act was entered into force, Turkish law lacked a mechanism for obtaining protection 
orders or policing measures to protect individuals against domestic violence.201 However, even 
once the Family Protection Act was in place, authorities did not exercise due diligence in 
implementing the relevant protection measures. As it did with regard to the Article 2 violations, 
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the Court found that the legislative framework should have enabled prosecuting authorities to 
pursue criminal investigations despite withdrawal of complaints.202 The Court cataloged all the 
assaults and injuries and contrasted them with the lack of intervention and punishment. The 
Court was “particularly struck by the Diyarbakir Magistrate’s Court’s decision to impose merely 
a small fine, which could be paid by installments, on H.O. as punishment for stabbing the 
applicant seven times.”203  The Court concluded that the local authorities failed to display “the 
required diligence to prevent the recurrence of violent attacks against the applicant” through 
protective measures, “since the applicant’s husband perpetrated them without hindrance” or 
criminal prosecution.204  
iii) Discrimination in Failing to Exercise Due Diligence  
¶76 Finally, the Court in Opuz made the historic finding that since domestic violence was 
shown to affect women far more than men and since Turkey had failed to exercise due diligence 
in providing protection from domestic violence, the state had violated Article 14 of the European 
Convention. In clarifying its standards for finding discrimination, the Court looked to D.H. and 
Others v. Czech Republic for the precedential holding that “’[W]where an applicant is able to 
show, on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a 
specific rule – although formulated in a neutral manner – in fact affects a clearly higher 
percentage of women than men, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result 
of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on the grounds of sex.’”205 Consequently, the 
Court in this case reviewed reports and statistics provided by a range of organizations, including 
the Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation, the Women’s Rights Information and 
Implementation Centre of the Diyarbakır Bar Association (KA-MER), Amnesty International, 
Diyarbakır Bar Association’s Justice For All Project, and the Women’s Rights Information and 
Implementation Centre.206 These reports found that women were the primary victims of domestic 
violence and that an attempt to address such violence would face significant obstacles. Requests 
for orders of protection were treated as divorce actions with delayed hearings, women saw 
limited success when they applied for protection orders, the police discouraged women from 
pursuing legal action and instead encouraged reconciliation, and perpetrators of honor crimes 
were granted leniency.207 The Turkish government did not challenge these findings. In its 
analysis of the data, the Court found that the “highest number of reported victims of domestic 
violence is in Diyarbakir, where the applicant lived at the relevant time, and that the victims were 
all women who suffered mostly physical violence.”208 
¶77  In addition to noting the statistical evidence, the Court acknowledged that it once again 
had looked to international legal instruments, decisions, and principles, such as the due diligence 
standard, in finding the existence of gender discrimination.209 The Court concluded that “the 
State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal 
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protection of the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional.”210 The Court 
welcomed Turkey’s recent legal reforms, but found serious problems with the implementation of 
the laws; police still treated domestic violence as a family dispute to be resolved privately, courts 
treated requests for protection as divorce actions rather than urgent requests for intervention, and 
authorities continued to tolerate domestic violence.211 The Court concluded that the applicant 
was able to demonstrate that “domestic violence affected mainly women and that the general and 
discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey created a climate that was conducive to domestic 
violence.”212 Furthermore, the violence suffered by Nahide and her mother “may be regarded as 
gender-based violence which is a form of discrimination against women.”213 
V. CONCLUSION  
¶78 The opinions in Bevacqua and Opuz represent a significant progression in the articulation 
of the due diligence standard. Specifically, as the Court held in these cases, states party to the 
European Convention must provide individuals with the means to obtain some form of 
enforceable protective measure, such as an order of protection, a restraining order, or an 
expulsion order. Member states must also establish the legal framework to enable criminal 
prosecutions of domestic violence when it is in the public interest, even if the victim withdraws 
her complaint. Through the holdings in Bevacqua and Opuz, these basic standards have gained 
binding legal authority within the jurisdiction of the ECHR. Furthermore, using these standards 
as a reference point, all nations can now begin to measure their success in exercising due 
diligence to prevent domestic violence, protect victims, and investigate and prosecute 
perpetrators. 
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